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ABSTRACT
A methodology for analyzing and evaluating alternative organizational
structures is presented. An information theoretic framework is used in which
each team member is described by a two-stage model consisting of situation
assessment and response selection stages as well as interconnections with the
rest of the organization. The information processing and decisionmaking load
of each team member and the measure of. organizational performance are
depicted in the performance-workload space as implicit functions of the
decision strategies of each individual member. The approach to evaluating
organizational structures is illustrated through the detailed analysis of an
organization consisting of two decisionmakers with bounded rationality.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A basic model of an interacting decisionmaker, appropriate for the study
of command and control organizations was introduced by Boettcher and Levis
(1982). In subsequent work, Levis and Boettcher (1982) considered the
modeling of organizations consisting of several decisionmakers who form a
team. In this paper, emphasis is placed on the modeling and evaluation of
organizational structures using the methodology for analysis already
developed.
An organization is formed in order to perform a set of tasks that
individuals cannot perform alone. The tasks to be performed by the
organizations being considered consist of receiving signals or inputs from
one or more sources, processing them, and producing outputs which can be
actions or signals. A single decisionmaker cannot perform these tasks
because of the large amount of information processing required and because of
the fast tempo of operations. The latter reflects the rate at which tasks
are assigned to the organization for execution.
The analytical framework used for modeling both the internal processing
within an organization member and of the organization as a whole is that of
n-dimensional information theory (McGill, 1954; Conant, 1976). The basic
departure from previous information theoretic models of a decisionmaker (for
a review, see Sheridan and Ferrell, 1974) is that in addition to information
transmission, the internal generation of information, blockage, and the
coordination of the information processing and decisionmaking functions are
also modeled. Consequently, the limitations of humans as information
processors and problem solvers are modeled as bounds on the total information
processing activity. To avoid overload, the total processing activity
associated with the tasks assigned to each team member must remain within the
bound. This model represents one interpretation of the hypothesis that
decisionmakers exhibit bounded rationality (March, 1978).
The inputs to the organization may be such that different signals are
received by different team members. It has been shown by Stabile, Levis, and
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Hall (1982) that the general case can be modeled by a single vector source
and a set of partitioning matrices that distribute components of the vector
signal to the appropriate decisionmakers within the organization. This model
is shown in Figure 1, where the input vector is denoted by X and takes values
from a finite alphabet XI. The partitions x i may be disjoint, overlapping or,
on occasion, identical.
ORGANIZATION
Fig. 1 Information structures for organizations.
In addition to defining the structure of the organizations, it is
necessary that the protocols, i.e., the rules that govern the interactions
between organization members, be specified. The types of interactions
allowed between team members are shown in Figure 2. The protocols are such
that the resulting information structures can be represented by acyclical
graphs (Levis and Boettcher, 1982). In the model shown in Figure 2, each
team member is assigned a specific task, whether it consists of processing
inputs received from the external environment or from other team members, for
which he is well trained and which he performs again and again for
successively arriving inputs. First, he processes the signals from the
environment in the situation assessment (SA) stage to determine or select a
particular value of the variable z that denotes the situation. He may
communicate his assessment of the situation to other members and he may
receive their assessments in return. This supplementary information may be
used to modify his assessment, i.e., it may lead to a different value of z.
Possible alternatives of action are evaluated in the response selection (RS)
stage. The outcome of this process is the selection of a local action or
decision response y that may be communicated to other team members or may
form all or part of the organization's response. A command input from other
decisionmakers may affect the selection process.
REST OF ORGANIZATION (RO)
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Figure. 2 Allowable team interactions.
In the model of the organization developed in the following sections,
internal decision strategies for each decisionmaker are introduced that
determine the overall mapping between the stimulus (input) to the
organization and its response (output). The total activity of each DM as
well as the performance measure for the organization as a whole are expressed
then in terms of the internal decision strategies.
For each set of admissible internal decision strategies, one for each DM,
a point is defined in the performance-workload space. The locus of all such
points is characteristic of the organizational structure. For particular
bounded rationality and performance constraints applied in this space, the
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effectiveness of a given organizational structure can be assessed and then
compared to alternative structures.
In the next section, the model of the interacting organization member is
reviewed. In the third section, a specific two-decisionmaker organization is
considered and the performance-workload locus is constructed and analyzed.
In the fourth section, a method for comparing alternative organizational
structures is presented and applied to two variations of the organization
considered in Section III.
II. MODEL OF THE ORGANIZATION MEMBER
The overall decisionmaking process is modeled as shown in Figure 3. The
presentation of the model given here is brief; for a more detailed
discussion, see Boettcher and Levis (1982).
Z Z' V'
X' X Z Z y
+ fi(x A(-,z') h2( )i
Figure 3. Single interacting decisionmaker model.
The DM receives a possibly noisy measurement x of his environment x',
which is in turn a subset of the organization's input X'. The vector x takes
values from a known finite alphabet according to the probability distribution
p(x). Two information theoretic quantities that describe the- input and its
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subsequent processing by the DM.are entropy, defined for a variable x as
and measured in bits per symbol, and conditional entropy
H(z) = - p(x) W p(zlx) log2 p(zlx) (2)
x -z
It is assumed that successive inputs are independent and that no learning
takes place as a sequence of inputs is processed. Therefore, the model is
memoryless , and all information theoretic expressions are on a per symbol
basis. The mean symbol interarrival time is r seconds; hence · becomes a
description of the tempo of operations (Lawson, 1981).
.Each arriving input is processed first by one of the U algorithms or
procedures fi. The selection of fi is made through the specification of the
variable u in accordance with the situation assessment -(SA) strategy p(u).
Each algorithm fi is deterministic, which implies that once the input value
is known, then all the variables, including the output z, are determined
uniquely. The deterministic algorithm A completes the SA stage processing by
combining z with the supplementary situation z' received from other
organization members. The modified situation assessment is denoted by i.
In the response selection stage, the DM again makes a selection; in this
case an algorithm hj is chosen according to the response selection strategy
p(vli). However, a command input vector v' may modify the choice v into V
according to a specified protocol. This is represented by the
(deterministic) algorithm B. The result of the RS processing is y, the
output of the decisionmaker.
Four aggregate information theoretic quantities characterize the
decisionmaking process. First, the mutual information or transmission or
throughput between inputs x,z', and v' and outputs y and z, denoted by
This assumption has been relaxed by S.A. Hall (1982) through the
introduction of memory.
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T(x,z',v:y,z) is a description of the input-output relationship of the DM
model and expresses the amount by which the outputs are related to the
inputs:
Gt = T(x,z',v':y,z) = H(x,z',v) + H(y,z) - H(x,z',v',y,z) (3)
Second, a quantity complementary to the throughput Gt is that part of
the input entropy which is not transmitted by the system. It is called
blockage and is defined as
Gb = H(x,z',v') - Gt
In this case, inputs not received or rejected by the system ate not taken
into account. A third quantity derives from the concept of noise present in
transmission, i.e., uncertainty in the output when the input is known.
Generalizing this notion to include the total system uncertainty which
remains when the input is known gives the quantity Gn:
G = H , ,(uW 1 ,...,WU V, 0 , 0 ,z~z.z.v~y) (5)Gn Hx,zf,v
where Wi is the set of internal variables of algorithm i; let a i be the
number of elements in the set. In the present context, Gn is not necessarily
undesirable noise; rather it is given the more general interpretation of
internally generated information.
The final quantity to be considered reflects all system variable
interactions and can be interpreted as the coordination required among the
system variables to accomplish the processing of the inputs to obtain the
output. It is defined by
1 U+V A B
G = T(u:w: ...:w :wl:...:wa :z:Z:V:z:y) (6)
~~c ~ ~ ~ B-
The Partition Law of Information (Conant, 1976) states that the sum of
the four quantities Gt, Gb, Gn, and Gc is equal to the sum of the marginal
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entropies of all the system variables (both internal and output variables),
i.e.,
G = Gt + Gb + Gn + Go (7)
where
When the definitions for internally generated information Gn and coordination
G = .H(wj) + H(u) + H(z) + H(i) + H(z) + H(v) + H(y) (8)
i,j
Gc are applied to the specific model of the decisionmaking process shown in
Figure 3 they become
Gn = H(u) + Hz(v) (9)
and
G r)[ i A BG 2 )}[pigc(X)) + aiH(pi)] + H(z) + gc(P(Z)) + g c(P())
i=l
+ ELpgU+J (p(zlv=j)) + aj H(pj)] + H(y)
+ H(z) + H(M) + H(V,Z) + T (x:z') + T_(x',z':v') (10)
z - z - -
In expression (10), which defines the system coordination, Pi is the
probability that algorithm fi has been selected for processing the input x
and pj is the probability that algorithm hj has been selected, i.e., u=i and
v=j. The quantities gc represent the internal coordination of the
corresponding algorithms and depend on the distribution of their respective
inputs. The quantity H is the entropy of.a random variable that can take one
of two values with probability p (Shannon, 1949):
H(p) =- p log2p - (l-p) log2(1-p) (11)
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The quantity G may be interpreted as the total information processing
activity of the system and, therefore, it can serve as a measure of the
workload of the organization member in carrying out his information
processing and decisionmaking task.
III. TEAMS OF DECISIONMAKERS
In the previous section, the information theoretic model of a
decisionmaker interacting with other members of his organization was given.
A general discussion of the extension of the framework to the modeling of
organizational structures has been presented in Levis and Boettcher (1982).
A basic requirement, in order for the methodology to be valid, is that the
interactions between DMs are acyclical. To review the construction and
characteristics of the organization's locus in performance workload space,
and also to provide a simple illustration of the method of organization
evaluation presented in the next section, a specific two decisionmaker
structure is considered in this section. By varying a particular parameter,
two distinct organizations are obtained which can then be compared.
The organizational structure is shown in Figure 4. Both decisionmakers
receive synchronized signals x1 and x2 from the organization's environment.
Each DM processes the external input using his respective situation
assessment algorithms; DM1 may choose between two f's. A portion of DM2 's
assessment is then passed to DM1 to be combined with the assessment zl to
obtain a final assessment z. The first decisionmaker then selects a
response which is, in this case, a command input to the second DM. The
latter receives the command input v' and, on the basis of that and his
situation assessment z2, selects an algorithm hj, j=1,2. His output y2 is
the output of the organization.
This particular configuration can be interpreted as follows. The second
DM receives detailed observations about a small portion of the environment on
which he has to act. He sends his estimate of the situation to the first DM
who has a broader view of the situation. DM1 then determines an overall plan
.9
v A
DM 2 z 2
Figure 4 Organization structure.
and communicates that to DM2. This signal, v', restricts the options of DM2
to be consistent with the overall plan. Finally, DM2 generates a response to
his (local) situation which has, in general, been affected by the information
he has passed to, and in turn received from, DM1.
The expressions for the total activity of each decisionmaker can be
derived by specializing eqs.(3) to (10).
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Decisionuaker 1
1 1 21Gt = T(x z :v (12)
1 = 1 21 1
Gb =H(U ,z )-_G (13)
1b 1 t
G =H(u) (14)
n (14)
GC l pig (p(S 1 )) + aiH(pi)]
1 A 1 12 h-i
+ H(zl) + g (p(z ,z )) + g (p(z 1 ) )
c c
1 '-1t1 21+ H(z1) + H(z ) + H(v') + T l(x :z (15)
z
Decisionaaker 2
Gt = T(x,v':z ,y)
(16)
2 2xG 2
Gb = H( ,v') - Gt
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~b t ~~~(17)
2 2
Gn Ez2(2 (18)
G2 = (p(x )) + H(z 2 z ) + g (p(z2),p(v'))
C C2
+ [Pjg9J (P(Z l22)) + a.H(pj)]
+ [p jc azj
+ H(z 2 ) + H(z v2 ) + H(y) + T 2 (x :v') (19)
It is clear that each decisionmaker's workload is dependent on the
actions of the other team member. Furthermore, in this specific example, the
total activity of DM2 will vary with DMl's choice of algorithm fi.
Bounded Rationality and Performance Evaluation
The individual limitations of human decisionmakers in processing
information are modeled as constraints on the total activity G of each DM. A
maximum processing rate Fr in bits/sec is assumed which, together with the
mean symbol interarrival time v (sec/symbol), yields the constraint
Gr =Gr + Gr + Gr + Gr ( Frr r = 1,2 (20)
t b n c
For a detailed discussion of this particular model of bounded rationality see
Boettcher and Levis (1982).
The performance of an organization in accomplishing its task is
evaluated using the approach shown in Figure 5. The organization designer
has a function or table L(X) which specifies a desired response Y for each
input X. The organization's actual response y can be compared to the one
desired and a cost assigned using a function d(y,Y). The expected value of
the cost serves as a performance index J. In the example considered here,
d(y,Y) is chosen such that J is the probability of error in decisionmaking.
X ORGANIZATION Y
(Aor B)
LX) d(y,Y) Ed(yY
Figure 5. Performance evaluation of an organization.
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Decision Strategies
For a given organization structure, the actual values of the total
processing activity G for each decisionmaker and the value of the
organization's measure of performance I are functions of the internal
decision strategies selected by each and every decisionmaker. A pure
internal decision strategy of the rth DM is one for which both the situation
assessment strategy p(u) and the response selection strategy p(vliZ) are
pure, i.e., one of the algorithms fi is selected with probability one and one
of the algorithms hj is selected with probability one when the situation is
assessed as being i. Therefore,
Dk = {p(u=i) = 1; p(v=jlz=z )} (21)m. .
for some i, some j, and each Zm a Z. For the rth decisionmaker, there are
nr possible pure internal strategies
n = U.VM (22)
where U, V, and M are the number of algorithms f, the number of algorithms h,
and the dimension of the set Z, respectively. All other internal strategies
are mixed (Owen, 1968) and are obtained as convex combinations of pure
strategies:
where
nr
Dr(Pk) = k (23)
k=l
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nr
= 1 ; Ok Yk (24)
k=1
Therefore, the possible strategies for an individual DM are elements of a
closed convex polyhedron of dimension nr-l whose vertices are unit vectors
and correspond to pure strategies Dr, i.e., corresponding to each Dr(pk) is a
point in the simplex defined by eq.(23).
Because of the possible interactions among organization members, the
value of the workload Gr depends, in general, on the internal decision
strategies of all decisionmakers. Define a pure organizational strategy for
a two person organization to be a pair of pure strategies, one for each DM:
1 2
A.. = {Di, D.1 (25)
1 x3 1 3
Since each DM is assumed to select his strategy independently, the strategy
space of the organization SO is determined as the direct sum of the
individual strategy spaces:
SO S + (26)
dim SO = (nl- 1) + (n2 - 1)
The strategies of each DM, whether pure or mixed, induce a behavioral
strategy (Owen, 1968) for the organization:
A = pip. A..j (27)
where Pi and pj are the probabilities of using Di I and D., respectively.
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Each decisionmaker in the organization of Figure 4 possesses two pure
strategies. They are denoted as Di and D21 for the first decisionmaker and
correspond to selecting the first situation assessment algorithm (u=l) or *the
second one (u=2), respectively. The pure strategies for the second
decisionmaker are:
2
1 : v = 2 otherwise
D2 : v = 2
where Z is a subset of the alphabet of z2, Z2. Therefore, the choice of
response selection algorithm depends on the value of the assessed situation
z2 . By varying the subset Z, different operating procedures can be
implemented and, consequently; different organizational performance will be
observed. Two operating procedures will be considered. In the first one,
referred to as Organization A, Z is a strict subset of Z2; the situation
assessment values are partitioned into two sets with each set being processed
by a different response selection algorithm h. In the second case,
Organization B, the choice of h is independent of z2 , i.e., is the set Z2
Since the number of pure strategies of both DM1 and DM2 is two, it
follows from eq.(26) that the dimension of SO is also two; the
organization's strategy space is the unit square. All the strategies of each
decisionmaker can be expressed as a convex combination of two pure
strategies:
+ r6 rDr(p) = D (6) = (1 ) D (28)
r r 1 r 2
r = 1,2 6 E[O,1
r
Therefore, the set of all strategies of the two person organization, eq.(27),
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can be expressed as
A= [(1 - ) 61& 1 11 l 1 2 F 62)
L2 1 A2 2 L 2
The strategy matrix has as elements the four pure strategies of the
organization; they are also the vertices of the unit square strategy space
SO
Performance - Workload Loci
A useful way of characterizing an organization is to consider the locus
of possible values of individual workload and the organization's measure of
performance as the organization's strategy A takes all possible values in SO.
For a two decisionmaker organization, the locus is contained in the three
dimensional space (J,G1,G2 ). The total activity G of each DM is a parametric
function of the two 6's, i.e.,
G (A) = Gr(61'62) (30)
and the organization's measure of performance J can be expressed as
J(A) =(l ) 6 J (1 61 11 1 2 f2
21 J22 62 (31)
where Jij is the performance corresponding to pure strategy Aij. The locus
of all admissible (J,G1,G2) triples is obtained by first assigning to one DM
a pure internal strategy and then considering the binary variation between
the second DM's two pure strategies. The complete locus is obtained in a
similar manner by fixing bi and varyingj 8 from zero to one, where 6i also
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takes all values from zero to one. The resulting loci for the two
organizational forms, A and B, are shown in Figures 6 and 7. The individual
performance-workload loci are shown as projections of the locus on the (J,Gr)
planes.
J
0.5 
0.4 
0.3
' .i
G' 0
30
45Figure 6. Organizational performance v sus ind vidual worklo d
Figure 6. Organizational performance versus individual workload
for Organization A.
It is clear from Figures 6 and 7 that the range of workload G for each
DM does not vary significantly between the two organizational forms. This is
not too surprising since the only difference between A and B is in the size
of the subset Z. the structure and basic operating procedures of both
organizations are the same. Consequently, the main change in the
characteristics of the locus comes from changes in the value of J due to
change in the subset Z. This difference becomes significant in the presence
of binding bounded rationality constraints and satisficing constraints. For
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example, let the maximum admissible probability of error be 0.32, i.e., the
performance of the organization is satisficing if J is less than or equal to
0.32. This satisficing constraint can be represented as a horizontal plane
in the (J,G1,G2) space that intersects the I axis at 0.32. It a'lso
intersects the loci of both organizations A and B. Since a larger portion of
organization A's locus satisfies the constraint than does B's locus, one may
deduce that A is the preferred design. Similarly, the bounded rationality
J
0.5
0.4
O.,
;-.t~~~~O
the portions of the performance-workload loci that satisfy the bounded
.......
~~1820
.......
.~~~~ ~Figure 7. Organizational performance versus individual workload
for Organization B.
constraints can be represented by a plane orthogonal to the corresponding Gr
::":'::':-::: axis. These planes may also partition the performance-workload loci. The
bounded rationality constraints are shown in Figures 6 and 7 as lines on the
:--'f:;:-':-- projections of the performance-workload locus on each (J,Gr) plane. Thus, a
qualitative comparison of two organizational forms can be made by comparing
rt o   form load l i t t ti f  t e bounded
rationality constraints of each individual member and the satisficing bound
on the organization's performance. The results of the comparison may change
as the tempo of operations changes and as the performance threshold $
changes. In the next section, a quantitative method for carrying out this
comparison is presented.
IV. ASSESSING AND COMPARING ALTERNATIVE ORGANIZATION DESIGNS
From the viewpoint of the organization designer, specification of a
structure means the allocation of information processing and decisionmaking
tasks to the organization's members so that the overall task is performed
without anyone being overloaded. In the implementation of a designed
structure, however, individual decisionmakers select their own internal
decision strategies independently of all other organization members. For
given constraints on processing load and performance, a particular structure
can yield a broad range of performance depending on the actual strategies
chosen by the decisionmakers. The designer must therefore also assess the
likelihood that strategies which are organizationally acceptable will be
selected, i.e., it must be insured that individual decision strategies are
mutually consistent.
Organization design begins with a set of specifications to be met, a
task to be performed. With the present framework, the designer proposes a
particular structure and specifies the protocols and sets of procedures to be
used by individual organization members. The selection of a specific
procedure as the organization operates is left as a free. variable, the
organization decision strategy. To determine whether the design will meet
the specifications, the designer must consider whether the possible
combinations of individual member decisions which may arise will be
consistent, on the whole, with design goals. For the present case, the
design specifications include a performance threshold J, i.e., performance
must be at least as good as J, and a maximum tempo of operations, i.e.,
minimum I, with which the organization must be able to cope.
A possible measure of mutual consistency can be obtained as follows.
Design specifications of constraints on performance, J, and individual
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workload, Gr, partition the space of organization strategies into subspaces
of feasible strategies. The intersection of such subspaces represents those
strategies which are mutually consistent for the given constraints.
Comparison of the locus of the feasible strategies with the total locus of
the organization strategy space SO is an indication of the likelihood that an
acceptable organization strategy, eq.(27), will be obtained as a result of
the individual choices of organization members. It is therefore an
indication of how close the organization may come to satisfying the design
specifications.
The problem is to determine, for a two-person organization and for given
T and J, namely,
r = so ; J = Jo
the subspaces Ri of organization strategies which are feasible with respect
to the bounded rationality constraint of each DM:
R = {Al G (A) }< FoI
R2 = [A G2(A) '< F2rA 3
.. 0~~~~~~~~~ (32)
R = [Al (A) < 0 I
R0 = R1 n R2 n \RJ
The subspace Ri contains the feasible A's determined by the 'performance
threshold I ; R0 is the overall feasibility subspace of the organization.
The volume of R0 , denoted by V(R0 ), is compared with that of So, V(S0 ), to
determine the measure of mutual consistency, Q, i.e.,
Q = V(R0 )/V(S0 ) (33)
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The ratio Q is a monotonic function of J and r with minimum zero and
maximum one. A null value for Q implies that no combination of strategies of
the individual decisionmakers will satisfy the design specifications, while
unity implies that all organizational strategies are feasible, i.e., satisfy
the bounded rationality constraints and the performance specifications.
Since Q can be expressed as a function of J and x only, it can be
plotted in the three-dimensional space (Q,J,r). The plots of the ratio Q for
organizations A and B are shown in Figures 8 and 9, respectively.
The monotonicity of Q with respect to its arguments is shown clearly in
both figures. The two surfaces, denoted by QA and QB, can be used to compare
he two organizational forms.
Fig. 8 Mutual consistency measure Q vs. I and r for Organization A.
Let the design specifications be:
(a) the mean interarrival time T is 0.95 sec.
(b) the performance threshold is 0.32.
21.'
* t 0.5.5
ou 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5'
Fig. 9 Mutual consistency measure Q vs. J and X for Organization B.
These specifications imply that the maximum tolerable probability of
error,the measure of the organization's performance, cannot exceed 0.32 and
that the maximum tempo of operations that will not lead to overload is
(0.95) - 1 symbols/sec. The values of Q for the two organizational forms are
QA = 0.73 % = 0.56
Clearly, QA is larger than QB . This means that for those design
specifications, organizational form A is better than B. If
QA %
for all values of J and z, then the organizational form A would always be
superior to B. In general, however, there exist values of J and · for which
B is better than A. This is the case for these organizations, too. Indeed,
for J equal to 0.4 and z equal to 0.75, QA is equal to 0.02 and QB is equal
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to 0.05. This means, in relative terms, that for these task specifications,
a greater percentage of the possible strategies of organization B yield
satisfactory performance than those of A. In absolute terms, neither
organization is well matched to the task.
V. CONCLUSION
In recent work, an aproach to the modeling and evaluation of information
processing and decisionmaking organizations has been developed. The emphasis
has been on describing an organization in a generalized performance-workload
space where the performance refers to organizational performance and workload
to the workload of each individual member. In this paper, a quantitative
procedure has been presented for modeling and analyzing alternative
organizational forms. The comparison is based on an analysis of how well
the alternative structures can satisfy the design specifications for a
minimum tolerable performance and for maximum tempo of operations. The
methodology is illustrated through application to two variants of a two-
person organizational structure.
REFERENCES
Boettcher, K.L. and A.H. Levis (1982). Modeling the interacting decisionmaker
with bounded rationality. IEEE Trans. Sys., Man, and Cybernetics, Vol. SMC-
12, pp. 334-344.
Conant, R.C. (1976). Laws of information which govern systems. IEEE Trans. on
Sys., Man, and Cybernetics, Vol. SMC-6, pp. 240-255.
Hall, S.A. (1982). Information theoretic models of storage and memory. S.M.
Thesis. LIDS-TH-1232, Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems, MIT,
Cambridge, MA.
23
Lawson, Jr., J.S. (1981). The role of time in a command control system. Proc.
Fourth MIT/ONR Workshop on C3 Systems, LIDS-R-1159, Laboratory for
Information and Decision Systems, MIT, Cambridge, MA.
Levis, A.H. and K.L. Boettcher (1982). Decisionmaking organizations with
acyclical information structures. Proc. 21st IEEE Conference on Decision and
Control, Orlando, FL, Dec. 1982.
March, J.G. (1978). Bounded rationality, ambiguity, and the engineering of
choice. Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 9, pp. 587-608.
McGill, W.J. (1954). Multivariate information transmission. Psychometrika,
Vol. 19, No. 2.
Owen, G. (1978). Game Theory, W.B. Saunders Company, Philadelphia, PA.
Shannon, C.E. and W. Weaver (1949). The Mathematical Theory of Communication.
University of Illinois, Urbana, IL.
Sheridan, T.B. and W.R. Ferrell (1974). Man-Machine Systems. MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA.
Stabile, D.A., A.H. Levis, and S.A. Hall (1982). Information structures for
single echelon organizations. Paper LIDS-P-1180, Laboratory for Information
and Decision Systems, MIT, Cambridge, MA.
24
